We present time series evidence on the performance of private equity funds using both summary and individual fund data from Burgiss as well as summary data from the other leading commercial datasetsVenture Economics, Preqin and Cambridge Associates -and other recent research. We focus on U.S. buyout and venture capital funds, considering the implications of these data for private equity performance. Average buyout fund returns in the U.S. have exceeded those of public markets for most vintages for a long period of time. In fact, the median buyout fund has outperformed public markets. Average venture capital fund returns in the U.S., on the other hand, outperformed public equities in the 1990s, but have underperformed public equities in the 2000s. Using the Burgiss individual fund data, we explore the relationship between absolute measures of performance -IRRs and multiples of invested capital -and performance relative to public markets. Within a given vintage year, performance relative to public markets is reliably predicted by a fund's multiple of invested capital and IRR. Overall and in most vintage years, the multiple of invested capital has superior explanatory power to the IRR. We apply the regression estimates and vintage year IRRs and multiples to estimate performance relative to public markets for the funds in the other commercial datasets. Private equity performance in the other commercial datasets is qualitatively similar to that in Burgiss with the exception that Venture Economics appears to understate fund performance, particularly for buyouts.
For VC funds, the PME results are generally consistent across all four databases although the funds in VE are, again, lower than those in the other three.
We interpret our results as suggesting that it is highly likely that the VE returns understate buyout and, possibly, VC fund performance. Furthermore, the consistency of the returns from Burgiss, Preqin and CA despite very different sample selection criteria suggests that they are likely to represent reliable measures of average buyout and VC fund performance.
In light of this, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that buyout funds have outperformed the public equity markets over most of our sample period. To invalidate that conclusion, all three reliable commercial datasets as well as the large LPs in Robinson and Sensoy (2011a) and Stucke (2011) would have to be subject to a similar positive selection bias despite very different data collection and reporting methods.
Finally, we evaluate two cross-sectional relationships -performance to capital flows and performance to fund size. We find that both absolute performance and performance relative to public markets are negatively related to aggregate capital commitments for both buyout and VC funds. This is consistent with and extends the results in Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) . These results differ from those in Robinson and Sensoy (2011a) who do not find that buyout funds PMEs are negatively related to capital commitments.
We do not find any reliable relation between performance and fund size for buyout funds. For VC funds, we find that funds in the bottom quartile of fund size underperform.
Controlling for vintage year, top size quartile funds have the best performance although it does not differ significantly from funds in the 2 nd and 3 rd size quartiles.
We are not able to address persistence across funds of the same GP with the Burgiss data at this time. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) focus on the persistence of performance across the funds of the same general partner and find strong persistence for both buyout and VC investors. They find persistence using both VE data and data from FOIA filings (analogous to the data used by Preqin). Robinson and Sensoy (2011a) find qualitatively similar levels of persistence in their sample.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the data we use. In section 3, we present and discuss our performance results. In section 4, we consider the relationship of performance relative to public markets to IRRs and multiples of invested capital. In section 5, we study the relation of absolute performance and relative performance to aggregate fundraising and fund size. Section 6 concludes by discussing the implications of our results.
Data
We use vintage year performance data for U.S. buyout and venture capital firms from keeping and fund investment monitoring. As a result, Burgiss data include the exact cash outflows made by the LPs to the GPs as well as the distributions from the GPs to the LPs. And, unlike with the other commercial databases, it is not possible for GPs to stop reporting. The data also are up to date so there is no question of lack of updating as there is with the other commercial databases. In other words, for a given LP, there is unlikely to be any selection bias.
The primary potential bias with the Burgiss dataset -which it shares with the other commercial databases -is whether the LPs who provide the fund data are selected in any way.
For example, it is possible that the LPs in the Burgiss sample have had a better than average experience with private equity which is why they use Burgiss and allow Burgiss to aggregate their results. (Our results that follow, however, lead us to be skeptical that this is the case.)
VE sources its data largely from fund investors (limited partners or LPs). Preqin obtains its data primarily from public filings by pension funds, from FOIA requests to public pension funds, and also voluntarily from fund managers (general partners or GPs) and LPs. As a result, for some, if not many funds, Preqin has IRRs and multiples, but does not have the underlying fund cash flows. CA provides investment advice to LPs and, as a result, is able to obtain its data from LPs and from GPs who have raised or are trying to raise capital. Harris et al. (2010) describe VE, Preqin and CA in greater detail.
Each of these datasets has a potential bias. Burgiss, while providing complete data from each LP, may have a selected sample of LPs. VE is dependent on LPs providing information.
Preqin is dependent on public filings and FOIA requests. As a result, Preqin may be missing some high performing VC funds that do not have public pension fund investors. CA may have a bias towards GPs who are raising new funds and, therefore, may have performed well. Most previous academic work has relied on VE - Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) -and Preqin -Lerner and Schoar (2007) .
We also report vintage year performance taken from Kaplan and Schoar (2005) , Robinson and Sensoy (2011a), and Stucke (2011) . All three of these papers make use of underlying cash flow data for funds. Kaplan and Schoar use data from VE through 2001.
Stucke uses data from VE and compares the cash flow data for many individual funds to data from a large LP. Stucke finds strong evidence that the VE data are not updated and, therefore, understate fund returns. We report his results that use the data from the large LP. Robinson and Sensoy also use fund cash flow data from a large LP. with CA, again, the highest. Unfortunately, because only Preqin reveals the identities of its underlying funds, it is difficult to know how much overlap there is across the various datasets.
The Preqin numbers overstate U.S. buyout funds because they include some funds raised by U.S. GPs in dollars that are earmarked for investment outside the U.S. The Burgiss data do not include such funds.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the capital committed to the buyout funds in the Burgiss, Preqin and VE performance datasets. Capital commitments for CA funds were not available.
The panel also compares the capital committed by the funds in the performance datasets to the total capital commitments to U.S. buyout funds reported by Private Equity Analyst (PEA). PEA maintains an annual measure of capital commitments to U.S. buyout and VC funds that goes back to the early 1980s.
VE has the greatest coverage of funds in the 1980s, with roughly 2/3 of capital committed. Preqin and Burgiss come in substantially lower at 41% and 28.5%, respectively. In the 1990s, the coverages in VE and Preqin are similar at over 70% with Burgiss covering over 50%. In the 2000s, Preqin remains above 70%; Burgiss increases to over 60%; while VE declines to below 40%. Table 2 reports the capital committed to the VC funds in the Burgiss, Preqin and VE performance datasets. The panel also compares the capital committed by the funds in the performance datasets to the total capital commitments to U.S. VC funds reported by PEA.
Again, VE has the greatest coverage of funds in the 1980s, with more than 100% of the PEA estimate of capital committed. Preqin and Burgiss come in substantially lower at 49% and 41%, respectively. In the 1990s, VE remains the highest of the three, but with coverage of roughly 75%. Preqin increases somewhat to almost 53% while Burgiss declines to 43%. In the 2000s, Preqin increases to over 71%; Burgiss increases to over 58%; while VE declines to below 52%.
As with buyout funds, the results suggest that the commercial datasets cover a substantial, but incomplete, fraction of capital committed to VC funds over the last thirty years. requires private equity firms to value their assets at fair value every quarter, rather than permitting them to value the assets at cost until an explicit valuation change. This has likely had the practical effect of making estimated unrealized values closer to true market values than in the past. This is particularly true for the Burgiss data whose estimates are up-to-date given that
Burgiss systems are used for the LPs' record-keeping.
The third performance measure we use is the public market equivalent (PME) from Kaplan and Schoar (2005) . The PME compares an investment in a private equity fund to an investment in the S&P 500. The PME calculation discounts all cash distributions and residual value to the fund at the total return to the S&P 500 and divides the resulting value by the value all cash contributions to the fund of invested discounted at the total return to the S&P 500. A PME greater than one indicates the fund (net of fees) outperformed the S&P 500. The PME can be viewed as a market-adjusted multiple of invested capital.
We do not attempt to adjust for differences in systematic risk in these basic analyses. In other words, the PME calculation assumes that the fund has a beta equal to one. This is arguably an appropriate comparison for institutional investors who invest in private equity expecting returns to exceed public equity returns. In their study of publicly traded funds of funds that invest in unlisted private equity funds, Jegadeesh et al.(2009) Figure 4A graphs the average multiples. We do not have weighted average or median vintage multiples from CA or Robinson and Sensoy (2011a In this section, we report several PME calculations. We report calculations of PMEs by vintage year using the individual fund cash flows from the funds in the Burgiss dataset. The relatively similar results for Burgiss, CA and Preqin in terms of IRRs and multiples in the previous sections suggest that the Burgiss PMEs are likely to be representative of the PMEs that would be calculated using the Preqin and CA datasets. We explore this is greater detail in section 4.
For comparison purposes, we also report the analogous PME calculations by vintage year from Kaplan and Schoar (2005) years with at least 10 funds, the median PME is below 1.0 in only 2 of 15 years. And, the average fund in the entire sample has an average PME of 1.19 and a median PME of 1.10.
These results strongly suggest that the buyout funds in Burgiss have significantly In light of these results, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that buyout funds have outperformed the public equity markets for quite some time. To invalidate that conclusion, all three reliable commercial datasets -Burgiss, CA, and Preqin -as well as the large LPs in Robinson and Sensoy (2011a) and Stucke (2011) would have to be subject to a similar positive selection bias despite very different data collection and reporting methods.
ii. Venture Capital Panel B of Table 5 Overall, then, the results suggest that VC PMEs exceeded 1.0 for most of the 1990s by a fairly wide margin. Since 1999, they have been less than 1.0, being particularly low for 1999 to 2002 vintages.
Relation of Absolute and Relative Performance Measures
Most commercial data providers and practitioners calculate and report the absolute measures of private equity performance -IRRs and multiples of invested capital. To our knowledge, only Burgiss calculates and reports performance relative to public markets. Burgiss reports the Kaplan Schoar-based PME as well as the Long-Nickels based market-adjusted IRR.
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A logical question is whether the absolute fund IRRs and multiples can be used to predict relative or market-adjusted performance in the absence of having fund cash flows to make that calculation directly. The answer to this question also is potentially relevant for a debate among practitioners as to whether IRR or multiples are better measures of performance.
Said another way, do IRRs or multiples provide a more accurate measure of market-adjusted performance?
Accordingly, in this section, we use the Burgiss fund data to explore the relation of PMEs to IRRs and multiples. In Table 6 , we report regressions of PMEs on IRRs and multiples.
We report standard errors both unclustered and clustered by vintage years. Clustering by vintage years increases the standard errors, but all of the coefficients of interest remain strongly statistically significant.
Columns 1 to 3 report regressions of PMEs on IRRs, multiples and both IRRs and multiples using vintage year dummies for buyout funds. Buyout fund PMEs are strongly related to IRRs and multiples. IRRs and vintage years alone explain 75% of the variation in PMEs; multiples and vintage years alone, 88% of the variation; and IRRs, multiples and vintage years explain 90% of the variation in PMEs. In other words, it is possible to predict a buyout fund's PME with a great degree of reliability knowing a fund's IRR, multiple, and vintage year.
Multiples explain substantially more of the variation in PMEs than IRRs.
Columns 4 to 6 repeat the regressions for VC funds. Again, both IRRs and multiples explain a significant amount of variation in PMEs. And, as with buyout funds, multiples explain substantially more variation in PMEs than do IRRs.
These results have two implications. First, each increase in multiple of 0.10 (equal to 10% of invested capital) is associated with an increase in PME of 0.066 for buyout and 0.055 for VC funds. If the funds have an effective duration of roughly five years, each 0.10 increase in multiple works is associated with roughly an additional 100 to 125 basis points per year relative to public markets.
Second, the consistent results for both buyout and VC funds suggest that multiples represent a more robust measure of fund outperformance than IRR (controlling for vintage year).
In The vintage year regressions have one additional implication. Given a fund's (or vintage's) IRR, multiple and vintage year, it is possible to predict its PME with a great degree of reliability. This is true even if one does not have a fund's cash flows, but only the (summary) IRR and multiple.
We take this implication seriously in Table 8 where we use the coefficients from the annual vintage year regressions in Table 7 for all three commercial databases -VE, Preqin and CA -just as they do for the Burgiss data.
As with the IRRs and multiples, the PME estimates for VE are lower than those of Preqin, CA and Burgiss both in the 1990s and 2000s. The CA PMEs are the highest, but only slightly higher than those of Burgiss and Preqin. The Preqin and Burgiss PMEs are roughly the same magnitude.
Consistent with the previous section, these results indicate that the buyout funds in the commercial databases have consistently outperformed public markets for some time. This is so despite the different selection criteria for the four different datasets. This suggests to us that it is likely that buyout funds as an asset class indeed have outperformed public markets for some time. Confirmation of this claim must await the emergence of a complete buyout fund dataset.
Nevertheless, for this conclusion to turn out to be incorrect, all four commercial datasets with different selection criteria would all have to have a substantial positive selection bias.
Panel B of Table 8 repeats our analysis for VC funds. The results are consistent across all four commercial datasets. VC funds outperformed public markets substantially in the 1990s in all four datasets. Burgiss and CA show somewhat stronger performance than Preqin and VE.
This may be driven by the fact that VE understates returns while Preqin is unable to obtain returns for the most prominent VC funds from publicly available data. Alternatively, for 2000
vintages, VC funds modestly underperform public markets in all four commercial datasets. The estimated PMEs are very similar across all four datasets.
Relation of Performance to Fund Flows and Fund Size
In this section, we use the Burgiss data to consider two possible determinants of private equity performance considered in previous work -the relation of performance to private equity capital commitments (or fund flows) and the relation of private equity performance to fund size. In our analysis, we measure performance using the weighted average performance of all funds in a vintage year from the Burgiss dataset. The results are qualitatively and statistically similar using average performance. We use the Burgiss data because we have consistent measures of PMEs over time. We take capital committed to U.S. buyout and VC funds using the annual estimates from Private Equity Analyst (PEA). As a measure of capital flows into the industry, we use capital commitments for the current and previous vintage year. This provides a measure of the amount of capital available to fund deals. In order to compare these capital flows over a long period of time, we deflate the two-year capital commitments by the total value of the U.S. stock market at the beginning of the vintage year. Our capital flow / capital commitment variable, therefore, reflects the amount of fund buying power available relative to the total value of the stock market. In a typical year, the two-year capital commitments to buyout funds average 0.76% (median of 0.70%) of the stock market value. The two-year capital commitments to VC funds average 0.27% (median of 0.23%) of the stock market value.
We estimate regressions using all vintages (in panel A of Table 9 ) and regressions using vintages from 1993 to 2008 when Burgiss begins to have more substantial fund coverage (in panel B of Table 9 ).
Consistent with Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) and Robinson and Sensoy (2011a) , buyout fund IRRs and multiples are significantly negatively related to capital commitments both over the entire sample period and in the more recent 1993 to 2008 period. As in the previous papers, this strongly suggests that an influx of capital into buyout funds is associated with lower subsequent returns. The regression coefficients imply that when capital flows increase from the bottom quartile of years (0.42%) to the top quartile of years (0.87%), IRRs decline by more than 500 basis points or 5% per year while multiples decline by 0.3 to 0.45.
We also find a negative relation between PMEs and capital commitments. This relation is economically, but not statistically significant over the entire period. The relation is statistically significant at the 1% level for the more recent period. Capital commitments explain 42% of the variation in PMEs over the later period. It turns out that the insignificance over the entire sample period is driven by the observations in 1984 and 1985 when Burgiss has relatively few observations. When these two years are excluded, the relation is statistically significant at the 7% level. The coefficients imply that PMEs decline by 0.08 to 0.14 when capital flows move from the bottom to top quartile.
We interpret these results as supporting the conclusion that buyout fund performance relative to public markets is negatively related to buyout fund capital commitments. This result is different from that in Robinson and Sensoy (2011a) . The difference appears to be driven by the relatively shorter time series in the Robinson and Sensoy data. As with buyout funds, we find a negative relation between PMEs and capital commitments for VC funds. The relation is significant (at the 5% level) for the more recent period and is also significant (at the 10% level) over the entire period. The coefficients imply that PMEs decline by 0.23 to 0.33 when capital flows move from the bottom to top quartile.
We interpret these results as supporting the conclusion that VC fund returns relative to public markets are negatively related to VC fund capital commitments. This result is consistent with that in Robinson and Sensoy (2011a). The performance sensitivities to flows, both absolute and relative, appear to be substantially greater in magnitude for VC funds than those for buyout funds. In unreported regressions, like Robinson and Sensoy, we find a concave relation between PME and the log of fund size for both buyout and VC funds controlling for vintage year. The regression coefficients, however, are significant only at the 12% level for buyout funds and are not at all significant for VC funds.
Overall, then, the results suggest a concave relation between size and performance for VC funds, but one that is driven by lower returns to smaller funds.
Summary and Implications
We believe the paper has a number of implications. Fourth, investment multiples generally provide better measures of performance relative to public markets than IRRs. In the regressions to explain PME, investment multiples consistently explain substantially more variation than IRRs. This suggests that LPs interested in outperforming public markets should place more weight on investment multiples.
Fifth, vintage year performance for buyout and VC fund, both absolute and relative to public markets, is related to overall capital commitments to the relevant asset class. This suggests that a contrarian investment strategy would have been successful in the past in these asset classes. The magnitudes of these relations have been greater for VC funds. Vintage Actual PME Actual PME Implied PME Implied PME Actual PME Implied PME Implied PME Implied PME Burgiss
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